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The Cultural Politics of Eurovision: A Case 
Study of Ukraine’s Invasion in 2014 Against 
Their Eurovision Win in 2016
Jordana L. Cashman
Brigham Young University
Abstract
Politics is officially banned from Eurovision, and songs that are too political can be 
prevented from being performed. However, the complete separation of culture and politics 
is impossible, and cultural performances often carry both indirect and explicit political mes-
sages. Eurovision is no exception. Eurovision as a cultural performance is political in nature 
and in the national responses it generates. This paper will examine the ways that European 
nations use Eurovision as a cultural platform from which to mediate inter-national and 
social politics.  It will be composed of both a review of existing studies done on Eurovision 
voting patterns and voting blocs as well as qualitative, descriptive examples. While many 
Europeans tacitly or explicitly understand Eurovision as a political platform, this article 
offers specific data analysis and an in-depth case study offering evidence that this is the case. 
Keywords
 Eurovision, Ukraine, eastern Europe, Eurovision voting blocs, Ukraine invasion, 
Crimea, Russia
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 The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) was formed on 12 February 1950 
by joining together 23 different broadcasting organizations. The original members were 
Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
In 1955, Marcel Bezençon, a Frenchman working for the EBU, came up with the idea for 
a European song contest, inspired by the Italian Festival di Sanremo while at a meeting in 
Monaco. The Eurovision Song Contest has been broadcast every year since 1956, and as of 
2008 has 43 participating countries (“The Story,” 2017). 
 Eurovision has closely tracked and expanded along with European integration. It 
was formed only three years after the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
and has been the producer of many of Europe’s more famous cultural icons, such as ABBA, 
Julio Iglesias, and Riverdance. The first Eurovision contest was held in Lugano, Switzerland, 
the headquarters of the EBU. In a well-known opinion piece on Eurovision, published in 
the New Yorker, Anthony Lane wrote that Eurovision was “a melodic antidote to the 
blood-soaked, strictly non-singing calamity that had ended a decade before” (Lane, 2010). 
Despite the fact that Eurovision is often mocked as nothing more than cultural kitsch, it is 
one of the few events that truly unites Europe as a cultural medium: in 2016, 204 million 
people saw at least one of the three shows (“Facts and Figures,” 2017). For comparison, the 
2016 Rio Olympics had a viewership of 27.5 million (NBC Sports Group, 2016). Its devel-
opment has been historically tied to cultural, economic, political, social and technological 
change (Vuletic, 2017). Because of its creation in a post-war, newly integrating continent, 
Eurovision has been created with the political context in mind. Without the history of war, 
the desire for cultural unification would not have been as strong. Eurovision, though not 
directly political in its creation, has always existed with a political consciousness that has 
been more or less apparent throughout the years. 
 While most Europeans generally understand that Eurovision is at least partly politi-
cal, little research has been done to systematically examine the ways that political events 
overlap with Eurovision’s performances and voting. This paper attempts to fill that gap. 
The first section reviews the much-discussed presence of voting blocs within Eurovision 
and how that impacts the outcome of the competition. The second section touches on the 
cultural and political messages sent by singing in English versus other European languages. 
The third section, which is also the bulk of the paper, analyses Ukraine’s win of Eurovision 
in 2016. First, the political nature of the song and political reactions to Ukraine’s win are 
explored. Second, votes are broken down between the three top prospects for the 2016 
win, Ukraine, Russia, and Australia. Third, votes for Russia and Ukraine are compared to 
the official state reactions to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and 
finds a correlation between state reactions and Eurovision votes. 
Voting Blocs in Eurovision 
 Critics of Eurovision consistently complain that Eurovision is all political because 
countries only vote for their political allies. When Sir Terry Wogan resigned in 2008 from 
providing commentary on the BBC’s broadcast of Eurovision, he stated that “The voting 
used to be about the songs. Now it’s about national prejudices” (“Is the Eurovision Song 
Contest a stitch-up?” 2014). Two major studies have been done to examine the presence 
of voting blocs within Eurovision: one independently by Derek Gatherer and another by 
University College London (UCL). Broadly, the results have shown that countries do tend 
to vote in blocs, but these are based on positive and not negative bias. In other words, 
countries are likely to support their friends and allies, but are not likely to practice discrimi-
nation against another country in particular. 
 In 2005, Derek Gatherer published a study of the alliances between countries as 
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evidenced by Eurovision voting. Using statistical modeling to simulate Eurovision voting, 
he found a complex evolution of voting blocs over time. A variety of small, two-or three 
country blocs traded votes from the 1970s into the 1990s. From 2001-2005, larger multi-
country voting blocs took shape. Gatherer cleverly named the alliances he found: the only 
countries left in pairs were “The Partial Benelux” of Belgium and the Netherlands and the 
“Pyrenean Axis” of Spain and Andorra. The partnerships sounding the Balkan countries 
became the “Balkan Bloc”: centered on Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro, 
the group also included Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey, Albania, Greece, Romania, 
and Cyprus. The other large group was the “Viking Empire”: Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Finally, the “Warsaw Pact” voting bloc 
consisted of Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (Gatherer, 2006). 
 The study shows that there is significant evidence of collusive voting around blocs, 
and that these blocs are capable of influencing the outcome of the contest. Most of these 
blocs are made up of conglomerates of collusive partnerships, and less of cohesive groups 
(Gatherer, 2006). Two main explanations of collusive voting are: first, regional culture and 
taste; second, a chance for countries to express their political and cultural views of others. In 
2003, when the UK garnered nul points, it was blamed on “post-Iraq backlash.” The early 
collusion between the Netherlands and Israel was seen as having its roots in the historical 
links between the Jewish Diaspora and the Low Countries (Gatherer, 2006). 
 In 2014, another study was done of voting patterns by the University College of 
London. As this study is more recent, it is more likely to explain or be pertinent to the 
results that are being seen today. Contrary to what the media would have most people 
believe, the study found no evidence of prejudicial or discriminatory voting. Instead, UCL 
found a series of cultural, geographical, and historical loyalties between countries. They 
find four distinct geographical groupings: the Former Yugoslavia, the Former Soviet bloc, 
Scandinavia, and the rest of Europe. There are moderate to substantial positive biases, 
which could be explained by strong cultural similarities (commonality in language, history, 
and to some extent geographical proximity and migration patterns). Greece and Cyprus do 
systematically vote for each other, and Greece also gives a lot of votes to Albania ("Statistical 
analysis unveils," 2014). Migration and immigration are also shown to have an impact on 
Eurovision. Dr Gianluca Baio, Professor at UCL in Statistical Science and a lead researcher 
on this project, said: 
Migration seems to be an interesting explanation for some of the patterns that 
we see in the data. For example, Turkey seems to be scored highly by German 
voters, possibly due to the large number of Turkish people who have migrated 
to Germany, and potentially tele-vote from there. But our analysis found no con-
vincing evidence of negative bias or discrimination against anyone – no country 
really has any enemies. ("Statistical analysis unveils," 2014) 
This strongly reiterates the point that countries do not use Eurovision voting to punish 
countries they dislike, but rather to reward the ones they do. 
 The conclusion that Eurovision voting reveals alliances, rather than prejudices, 
could be useful for anyone wishing to greater understand inter- and intra-European soli-
darity. Eurovision voting tends to fall along the lines of those countries that seem to have 
similar values and identity, and this could be one (admittedly rather informal) tool for track-
ing how alliances shift over time. 
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Singing in English 
Another consistent observation from both quantitative and qualitative descriptions 
of Eurovision is that performers that sing in their own language are consistently scored 
lower than contestants singing in English (Statistical analysis unveils the hidden patterns 
in Eurovision voting 2014). It was the rule from 1966-1972 that you had to sing in the 
language of the country you represented; that was reinstated in 1977 for another twenty 
years. Countries that don’t sing in English have difficulty gaining popularity outside their 
own country and are at a disadvantage. As one commentator said, “The Greek guys? Good 
song, but it’s in Greek. Will they play that on the radio in France?” (Lane, 2010). 
Of all the songs that have reached the finals, 263 have been in English and 150 
have been in French (Lane, 2010). Those are the only two languages in the triple digits. 
On this subject, Lane stated: “On the other hand, when you sing in English, you may be 
blasting through the language barrier to reach a wider audience, but are you not abasing 
yourself before the Anglo-American cultural hegemony that the competition is clearly 
designed to rebuff?” (2010). Navigating the different messages sent by singing in either 
English or a native language is a simultaneously cultural and political action. What language 
business, or song, or legislation is conducted in has ramifications for European Union (EU) 
policy, the relative importance and political power of each nation, and the methods of EU 
integration or dis-integration. 
Ukraine Case Study: Reactions to and Analysis of Ukraine’s Win in Eurovision 2016
Ukraine’s win in 2016 is an ideal scenario to explore the themes above and the 
ways Eurovision can and does function as a simultaneously cultural and political event. 
Ukraine won Eurovision with Susana Jamaladinova’s song “1944,” which describes the 
suffering of the Crimean Tatar people in 1944 when they were deported to central Asia 
by Stalin. The song opens with the lyrics “When strangers are coming, they come to your 
house, they kill you all and say ‘We're not guilty'.” Despite the ban on political songs, 
“1944” was allowed on the basis of being historical and not political in nature (Associated 
Press, 2016). Jamala’s performance was unlike most other contestants’. It was not upbeat 
Europop; instead, it had elements of traditional Crimean folk music and a significant por-
tion of the song is in Crimean (Gessen, 2016). Singing in a blend of English and Crimean 
Tatar mediated the balance between allowing the song to be understandable enough to a 
wider audience that it could gain popularity while still incorporating nationalist elements 
and partial cultural autonomy. 
Crimea’s history and reactions to Ukraine’s win. 
The Crimean Tatars are native to the Crimean peninsula. They have a long his-
tory of persecution under Russian rule, and in 1944 they were deported from Crimea. 
The pretext for their deportation was giving aid to the Nazis during the German occupa-
tion. Several other ethnic groups were also deported at this time, but the Crimean Tatars 
were the only group prevented from returning to their homes at the end of the Stalinist 
terror. In 1989, many of them returned to the Crimean peninsula to establish cultural, 
democratically-elected self-rule. This system was ended when Russia annexed Crimea in 
2014 (Gessen, 2016).
Despite the historical events at the foundation of the song, “1944” had direct 
contemporary relevance after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Highlighting past injustices 
between Russia and the Crimean Tatars immediately brought to mind the current political 
situation between Ukraine and Russia. The fact that a Crimean woman was singing on 
behalf of Ukraine and not Russia was an important political statement in the first place. 
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Second, as a representative of Ukraine, it was a way to bring to mind the ways that Russia’s 
foreign policy toward Ukraine has been consistently aggressive throughout history, adding 
weight to their continuing invasion of the Donbass. 
Ukraine’s win had political weight in Europe, as evidenced by Russia’s immedi-
ate negative response. After Jamala’s win, Russian star Sergey Lazarev insisted on Russian 
state news that the jury had purposefully lowered his score from what it should have been. 
Another Russian pop star who joined Lazarev in Stockholm claimed that someone had 
“worked the jury over” (Gessen 2016). Russian state news produced twenty stories over 
the next day to explain and analyze the win. One stated that the Crimean Tatars were 
furious that their history of persecution was being cheapened by performance in a pop 
song. Another asked the inevitable question: “How will it be possible to hold Eurovision 
in a country that has a hole in its budget, a war in the east, and regular disturbances in its 
capital?” (Gessen, 2016).
The leader of the Crimean Tatar parliament, the Mejlis, was also featured on 
Russian state news entering the Eurovision venue in Stockholm the day after the compe-
tition. Russian state news gave only three details: the name of the Mejlis leader, Mustafa 
Dzhemilev, that a search warrant is out for him in Russia, and that the parliament is “recog-
nized by no one” (Gessen, 2016). This is only partially true. Dzhemilev is in exile because 
he was turned back by Russian border guards while trying to return home to Crimea. An 
arrest warrant was issued by a court in Russian-occupied Crimea and the Crimean chief 
prosecutor stated that Dzhemilev had violated three articles of the Russian penal code. 
Dzhemilev spent fifteen years in prison in the Soviet era for advocating the return of the 
Tatars to Crimea. He has been elected to the Ukranian parliament five times since the fall 
of the Soviet Union. Russian state news implied he was the one to convinced the jury to 
vote for Jamala (Gessen, 2016).
Who voted for whom? Russia, Ukraine, and neutral Australia. 
Eurovision voting is more complicated than a simple majority, as it is split between 
both a jury and a popular vote. The jury vote can be taken as a proxy for the official gov-
ernment position, because the jury is seen as speaking for the country. The popular vote 
is the voice of the people living in that country, including immigrants. In the popular 
vote, the Russian contestant Lazarev won; the juries selected the contestant from Australia. 
When they were tallied together, however, Ukraine’s Jamala turned out to be the winner. 
Looking at votes from TV audiences alone, Ukraine put Russia first and Russia voted for 
Ukraine only second to Armenia (Gessen, 2016).
Ukraine’s televote for Russia was a particularly interesting choice. Ukraine has 
participated in Eurovision since 2003, and between 2003 and 2012, Russia was scored in 
Ukraine’s top three slots every year except 2005, when Eurovision took place only months 
after the Orange Revolution. In 2013 and 2014, Ukraine scored Russia 7th, awarding it 
only 4 points, and they did not participate in 2015. The 2016 competition was the first 
year that televoting and the judges’ votes were separated. Previously, the televotes and the 
judges’ votes were combined to provide the final points awarded to each country. For the 
first time ever, in 2016 the judges awarded Russia no points (Eurovision 2016 Results: 
Voting & Points, 2016). Though it cannot be proven, Ukraine’s voting history tracks 
closely with its relationship to Russia. In the most recent years, when tensions between the 
nations have been high, judges have awarded Russia lower points.  
The situation becomes more interesting when the overall votes for Ukraine’s win 
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are examined. The situation, in short, is that Australia1 won the jury vote, and Russia won 
the televote, but Ukraine came in second in both, and therefore won overall. 
Australia won the jury vote with 320 points from a smattering of Western and 
Southern European countries.2 This outstripped Ukraine by far, which won only 211 votes 
by jury3 (Eurovision 2016 Results: Voting & Points, 2016). The jury vote was highly mis-
matched to the popular vote, although Ukraine didn’t win the popular vote either. Russia 
won the popular vote with 361 points. Here, Ukraine was not far behind and came second 
with 323 televotes4 (Eurovision 2016 Results: Voting & Points, 2016). 
Three main observations can be made after this explanation of voting practices. 
First is that Ukraine’s win in Eurovision was not the result of all Europe banding together 
to show support for a nation under attack. Though there was general support for Ukraine’s 
overtly political Crimean song, it was neither straightforward nor outright. In the jury 
vote, almost half of the participating countries (18 of 42) gave either 10 or 12 points to 
Australia (Eurovision 2016 Results: Voting & Points, 2016). As Russia was the obvious 
popular choice, Australia has been interpreted by many as a neutral, non-European option 
to entirely sidestep the choice between supporting either Ukraine or Russia (Sasse, 2016). 
Two countries awarded no points to Ukraine, Russia, or Australia. For comparison, four-
teen countries gave Ukraine either 10 or 12 points in jury votes. Support for Ukraine 
was somewhat broader in televoting, where Ukraine was awarded 10 or 12 points by 18 
countries—precisely equal to Australia in the jury vote (Eurovision 2016 Results: Voting 
& Points, 2016). 
Second, Western European countries, in another act of sidestepping, mostly voted 
for other large Western European countries. France and Norway gave twelve points to 
Italy; Italy gave twelve points to Spain; Ireland and Iceland gave twelve points to Belgium. 
The UK and Germany were outliers, giving twelve points to Georgia and Israel, respec-
tively (Eurovision 2016 Results: Voting & Points, 2016). This falls in line with Western 
Europe’s general voting bloc patterns while also reflecting their political unwillingness to 
engage with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 
Third, support for Russia was weak in the jury vote but strong in the popular 
vote. Only four country juries gave Russia 12 points, and none gave it 10 points. This can 
be compared with the 19 countries that awarded Russia 10 or 12 points through televot-
ing, greater than either Ukraine or Australia gained (Eurovision 2016 Results: Voting & 
Points, 2016). Despite the official unwillingness to endorse Russia, popular favor does not 
1   Australia first participated in Eurovision in 2015 as a supposedly one-time special participant. However, they 
have since competed in both the 2016 and 2017 competitions. They are not the only “conventionally” non-Eu-
ropean country to participate: Israel has competed regularly since 1976, and Morocco has also participated. The 
European Broadcasting Union has not yet decided on whether Australia will be allowed to participate long-term 
(Denham 2016). 
2  Australia was given 12 point votes from Albania, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, and was given 10 points from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Iceland, Israel, Moldova, Norway, and Poland.
3  Ukraine received 12 points from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Denmark, Macedonia, Georgia, Israel, Latvia, Mol-
dova, Poland, San Marino, Serbia, and Slovenia. They received 10 points from Azerbaijan, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom.
4  Russia was given 12 points by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Moldova, 
Serbia, and Ukraine. It was awarded 10 points by televote by Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Israel, Malta, Montenegro, San Marino, and Slovenia. Ukraine was awarded 12 points by the Czech Republic, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and San Marino. It was awarded 10 votes by Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Be-
larus, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Russia.
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seem to have been affected by Russia’s frozen conflict within Ukraine. Support for Russia 
came from Central and Eastern Europe; the only Western or Scandinavian country to select 
Russia first or second in televoting was Germany. Ukraine, at least, gained televotes from 
France, Italy, and Austria. 
Matching up state reactions and Eurovision votes: 2014 vs 2016. 
Though examining the political motivations for Ukraine’s performance and the 
political reactions to the event are useful, this does not provide enough evidence to con-
clude that countries’ Eurovision votes align with their politics off-stage. To examine if this 
is the case, this section compares countries’ reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 
2014 to their voting in Eurovision 2016, to see if there is a relationship between the two. 
Indeed, there is evidence of a correlation between the reaction to Russia’s invasion in 2014 
and the voting patterns of the politically-charged 2016 Eurovision contest. 
The countries whose juries awarded Russia 12 points are Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Cyprus, and Greece. Azerbaijan’s official stance on Russia’s invasion of Crimea has been 
to keep silent. The news in Azerbaijan covered the situation in Ukraine extensively and 
relatively bias-free, for or against Russia’s invasion. Top officials in Azerbaijan have offered 
no comment on the situation. A high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that it would 
prefer to stay silent and not lose something by speaking out. “It is such a crisis that you can-
not avoid taking sides when making a statement,” the official said. “The decision is to keep 
silent” (Owen, Girgoryan, & Abbasov, 2014). On March 4, 2014, some of the members 
of the Azerbaijani parliament attempted to open debate on the subject of Russia’s invasion 
of Ukraine. Parliament Speaker Ogtay Asadov quickly ended the debate, saying, “Russia 
and Ukraine are two kindred nations and will solve problems by themselves” (Owen et al., 
2014). There was not a lot of support in the Azerbaijani administration for the Ukranian 
leaders that took charge in Kyiv. Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Ukraine made a low-profile 
statement expressing support on March 3, 2014 for Ukraine’s territorial integrity in refer-
ence to Crimea. Azerbaijan is currently attempting to regain control of Karabakh, a region 
under Armenian control (Owen et al., 2014). 
On February 27, 2014, Belarus’ Foreign Minister Vladimir Makey stressed 
the importance of preserving the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of 
Ukraine. He also emphasized the importance of the partnership between Ukraine and 
Belarus (Foreign Ministry of Belarus, 2014). Then on March 19, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs released a statement which contradicted the former statement from the Foreign 
Minister. The statement describes Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine as “brotherly states inter-
twined by the common history that goes back centuries” (Foreign Ministry of Belarus, 
2014) and expresses concern that politicians outside of these countries try to decide what 
is best for Slavic peoples. The statement expresses that Belarus is “against one-sided, biased 
interpretation” (Foreign Ministry of Belarus, 2014) of the situation in Ukraine. Overall, the 
tone of the statement was relatively sympathetic to Russia, while not denying the complica-
tions for Ukraine. 
On March 23, 2014, the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, answered 
questions from the media and addressed the situation in Ukraine. He first expressed disgust 
and pain at the events in Ukraine, though it was unclear if he was referring to Russia’s 
invasion, the change in government, or both. He expressed clearly that he did not approve 
of any kind of overthrow of “legitimate government” ("President of the Republic," 2014) 
and expressed only mixed support for the new politicians and leaders in power. President 
Lukashenko linked the politicians in power in Ukraine with the UNA-UNSO, the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the massacre at Khatyn, and then referredo the Ukranian 
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Insurgent Army as subhumans. He did express support for the “good people, professionals, 
and businessmen” ("President of the Republic," 2014) in the new Ukranian government. 
His statement on Crimea was highly sympathetic to Russia’s invasion. He said: 
As for Crimea, I do not like it when the integrity and independence of a country 
are broken. However, who masterminded this situation? Many say that Russia 
could not wait to grab Crimea and annex it and so on. You are politicians, you 
should not have given the reason to let it happen. When Russia saw these perse-
cutions of Russians or rather all Slavonic people, when Crimea faced this threat 
(Crimea once belonged to Russia, however, this is not the point) Russia had to 
interfere, as there are 1.5 million Russians there and about two million who could 
not accept the developments in Ukraine. No one can say that Russia took to the 
arms and people went there and grabbed Crimea. The current government gave 
the reason for it to happen. ("President of the Republic," 2014)
Despite the caveat at the beginning, the President of Belarus essentially endorsed Russia’s 
invasion of Ukraine. His response is overall more sympathetic to Russian aggression than 
to a violation of international law or Ukrainian sovereignty. 
No official statements or reactions to the annexation of Crimea by Russia can be 
found for the governments of Cyprus or Greece.
Responses by those that voted for Russia are in direct contrast to the responses 
from the countries that gave 12 points to Ukraine, which are the Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Denmark, Macedonia, Georgia, Israel, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, San Marino, Serbia, and 
Slovenia. In a press conference, the BH Foreign Minister Zlatko Lagumdzija emphasized 
Ukraine’s right to define their future independently, and called on the international com-
munity to immediately act to prevent an escalation of conflict in Ukraine. He, on behalf 
of the nation, urged the UN to take action to protect Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty 
(SRNA, 2014). 
Denmark’s Foreign Minister Martin Lidegaard made a statement on 2 March that 
Russia had “invaded Ukraine” and discussed the numbers of Russian troops stationed in 
Crimea and the Black Sea. He said that despite the claim of protecting Russian minorities 
in Ukraine, annexing and invading are wholly unacceptable ways of doing that. Minister 
Lidegaard made clear that he was working with other diplomats in the EU to prepare a state-
ment which would make clear that Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty 
was totally unacceptable and they condemned it in every way possible, while also keeping 
the possibility of negotiating with Russia (Lidegaard: Russia has invaded Ukrainem, 2014). 
The President of Georgia responded formally to the situation in Ukraine. Having 
similarly experienced Russian military aggression and invasion, Georgia is particularly sen-
sitive to the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Georgian President Giorgi 
Margvelashvili stated that Russia’s actions toward Ukraine is an act of aggression against 
their territorial sovereignty. He particularly condemned the distribution of Russian pass-
ports, the reinforcing of Russian military infrastructure, and the explanation that it was for 
the protection of Russian minorities in Ukraine. The President then said, “Solving of fate, 
future and territorial integrity of the states through pressure and forceful interference from 
other state is inadmissible. We call on the international community not to allow new con-
flict in Europe and to use all the available means in order to avert possible aggression and 
to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” ("Georgia Condemns," 2014). 
He encouraged the United States, the EU, and “the entire democratic world” to not allow 
what happened in Georgia to happen to Ukraine. He made clear the political leaders of 
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Georgia would “spare no effort” in supporting Ukraine’s people and security. President 
Margvelashvili’s statements were then repeated again on Georgian news by Georgian First 
Deputy Foreign Minister Davit Zalkaliani ("Georgia Condemns," 2014).
Israel kept general silence on the Ukraine crisis until 5 March, when it stated that 
it hoped for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution to the crisis that would not involve the loss 
of human life. The Jewish Agency also stated that it would send aid to the Jews living in 
Ukraine. Jewish Agency Chief Natan Sharanksy said the organization would also strengthen 
Jewish institutions in Eastern Europe and would launch a fundraiser to increase their secu-
rity (Times of Israel Staff and AFP, 2014). 
Latvia released a joint statement by the President of Latvia, Speaker Saeima, the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister on the Ukraine crisis. It began, “Latvia strongly 
stands for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and is of the opinion that any measures aimed 
at splitting Ukrainian society and questioning the territorial integrity of the country must 
be condemned in the strongest terms possible” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Latvia, 2014). It condemned Russia’s use of military forces in Ukraine as a “gross vio-
lation of international law” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, 2014) 
and described Russia’s legal decisions as a “hypocritical attempt” to disguise with legality 
an illegal and unjustified use of military force. The statement warned that Russia’s actions 
undermined the bases for the international security system and reminded the international 
community of the treaties in place that were supposed to protect Ukraine’s territorial sov-
ereignty. The statement urged the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and others to 
“act without delay” and to discuss Ukraine’s situation at NATO’s Foreign Affairs Council. 
The statement ended, “In our hearts and minds we are together with the Ukrainian 
people!” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, 2014). “The Crimea sce-
nario resembles the occupation of the Baltic states by the USSR in 1940,” Latvian Foreign 
Minister Edgards Rinkevics said on his Twitter account. “History repeats itself, first as 
tragedy, second as farce” (Seputyte & Eglitis, 2014). 
Macedonia’s Foreign Ministry released a statement expressing concern about the 
growing violence in Ukraine. It urged the international community to take all actions nec-
essary to end the violence, ease tensions and establish a dialogue with all parties involved 
(Republic of Macedonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). 
Moldova’s President released a response expressing concern and urging nations to 
observe Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and independence. He described Russia’s actions 
as an violation of international law and principles and called for the urgent use of all “inter-
national mechanisms” to resolve the situation rapidly and diplomatically (Presidency of the 
Republic of Moldova, 2014). 
Poland had an extremely strong reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. On 1 
March, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the following statement:
In the context of recent developments in Crimea Poland strongly appeals for 
respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and observing international law, includ-
ing fundamental principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Any decisions that will be taken in the coming days, including of mili-
tary nature, could have irreparable consequences for the international order. We 
call for stopping provocative movements of troops on the Crimean Peninsula. 
We urge states-signatories to the Budapest Memorandum of December 1994, 
which gives Ukraine security assurances, to respect and fulfil their commitments. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2014) 
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 The Prime Minister of Poland also stated that Europe’s dependence on Russian gas 
should be lessened in order to give Russia less power over Europe and prevent “potential 
aggressive steps by Russia in the future” ("Germany’s dependence," 2014). 
San Marino made no official response to the Ukraine crisis. 
Serbia stated in November that it would like to reiterate support for the territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, and emphasized that only through discussion and 
diplomacy would a solution be reached that was in line with international treaties and law 
(Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2014). 
Slovenia’s Prime Minister Alenka Bratušek made a statement encouraging all 
efforts possible to ensure there is no armed conflict in Ukraine. Slovenia took an active role 
as mediator between Russia and Ukraine in the process ("Bratuškova," 2014). 
There is a clear correlation between the response by each country to the Ukraine 
crisis in 2014 and the way each of these countries voted in Eurovsion 2016. Those countries 
which awarded Russia top points in Eurovision also had responses to the Ukraine crisis that 
were much more sympathetic to Russia, or did not respond at all. The countries which 
voted for Ukraine, with the exception of San Marino, had consistently strongly negative 
responses to Russia’s invasion. Many of the countries which gave twelve points to Ukraine 
were countries with a history of Soviet aggression and influence themselves, including 
Georgia, Latvia, Poland, and Moldova. Several Balkan states also gave twelve jury points 
to Ukraine, and Russia’s history of interest in the Balkans is long-standing and well docu-
mented. Multiple of these countries also expressed a desire for the international community 
to act in the Ukraine crisis. While it is not possible to say how much a country’s jury voting 
was directly a result of a country’s politics, it’s clear that Eurovision voting at the very least 
reflects the political realities between countries. 
At the most, Eurovision voting is a direct response to a political situation. The 
song sung by Jamala was political enough in content to provoke, to some degree, a neces-
sary consciousness of the politics between Russia and Ukraine, and Russia and Europe, on 
the part of the juries in the ways they assigned their votes. And this consciousness is clearly 
reflected in voting patterns. 
Conclusion
After its beginning as a cultural and quasi-political event, Eurovision has devel-
oped over time to incorporate voting blocs that reflect political friendships. In the most 
recent Eurovision contest, the political events and relationships in Europe were clearly 
mirrored in the voting patterns of different European countries. There were clear divides 
between voting patterns of Western and Eastern Europe, as well as between the popular 
vote and the more clearly political jury vote. The Ukraine crisis was clearly in the minds 
of all participants after Jamala’s song about the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, and vot-
ing patterns followed the same lines as political reactions did after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. 
Though it has not always been so explicit, the 2016 Eurovision Song Contest was clearly 
a political as well as cultural event. 
Though its politics are generally understood by most Europeans, Eurovision’s pat-
terns should be given greater attention, as they reflect the attitudes and values of European 
countries. Though there is plenty of evidence to look at in addition to a singing contest, 
Eurovision is an opportunity for those studying European alliances to see generally where 
countries’ priorities lie. It provides a yearly snapshot of how European countries are inter-
acting with each other: who they want to be close with, who they leave alone. It reflects 
migration patterns, cultural patterns, political patterns. Through all the camp, for those 
who pay close attention, Eurovision can become a tool to better understand Europeans’ 
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allegiances. 
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